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States in Africa are labeled “system ineffectual,” inconsequential to 
global politics, and lacking material and ideational capabilities to 
structure their foreign relations. The result is a portrayal of a passive 
Africa at the whims of its bilateral partners—be they China, the United 
States, or Russia. Contra this impolitic framing of Africa, this article 
explores how states in Africa are strategically shaping the norms of 
development paradigms promoted by foreign powers and influencing 
external actors to legitimize their preferred norms. Empirically focusing 
on China’s development model in Africa, the article examines how norms 
related to the model are being shaped and diffused; and how through the 
ingenuity of political elites, China is making the China model “on the 
go.” The main argument is that political elites in Africa are strategically 
reconstructing the China model, creating their own multifaceted versions 
that delicately balance their own domestic interests and their bilateral 
relations with China while deriving maximum benefits from the People’s 
Republic of China.
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Las élites políticas Africanas y la(s) hechura(s) del modelo de China en África
Los estados en África se consideran ‘sistémico-inefectivos’, 
inconsecuentes respecto a la política global y carentes de capacidades 
materiales e ideacionales para estructurar sus relaciones exteriores. El 
resultado es un retrato de una África pasiva a merced de los caprichos 
de sus socios bilaterales ya sea China, Estados Unidos o Rusia. Contra 
este enmarcamiento apolítico de África, este articulo explora cómo 
los estados en África están estratégicamente moldeando las normas 
de paradigmas de desarrollo promovidas por poderes exteriores que 
influyen sobre actores externos para legitimar sus normas preferidas. 
Nos enfocamos empíricamente en el modelo de desarrollo chino en 
África y examinamos cómo normas relacionadas con el modelo están 
siendo moldeadas y difundidas; y como a través de la ingenuidad de las 
elites políticas China va haciendo el modelo chino de poco a poco sin 
tener una versión definitiva. Nuestro principal argumento es que las elites 
políticas en África están reconstruyendo estratégicamente el modelo 
chino, creando sus propias versiones multifacéticas que delicadamente 
balancean sus intereses domésticos y sus relaciones con China al mismo 
tiempo que derivan beneficios máximos de la República Popular China.
Palabras Clave: Modelo Chino, Socialización, Normas, Agency, Regional 
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Africa, unlike other regions of the world, has never in modern history 
had among its ranks countries that sought global dominance—or threatened 
the dominance of other global powers. In Wole Soyinka’s (2014, 25) words 
“politically, technologically, commercially, and in religion, Africa has never 
posed a hegemonic threat.” Instead, in its recent history, Africa is consistently 
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subjected to external subjugation: “its economic system and thus its political 
policy is directed from outside” because “foreign capital is used for the 
exploitation rather than for [Africa’s] development” (Nkrumah 1965, ix, x). This 
is partly because states in Africa are, as Robert Keohane (1969) puts it, “system 
ineffectual.” They “can do little to influence the system-wide forces that affect 
them, except in groups which are so large that each state has minimal influence 
and which may themselves be dominated by larger powers” (Keohane 1969, 
296). As it stands, Africa remains under the dominance of other global powers. 
In concurrence, Christopher Alden (2010, 12) argues that “over the last fifteen 
years, emerging powers have made significant inroads into Western dominance 
in Africa.” What is unfolding is that former colonial powers that established 
the Westphalian state in Africa still maintain extensive influence in their former 
colonies—and with the emergence of rising powers like China, Africa has 
returned to being the “warring ground of the world’s traditional [and emerging] 
hegemonists” (Soyinka 2014, 25). Soyinka’s assertion of an Africa being fought 
over highlights perceptions, especially in the West, of passivity, impotency, and 
lack of agency in African states, and is reflected in statements by global leaders.
With the rise of non-Western emerging powers, development and governance 
models are the new frontiers of geopolitical competition between the West and 
China for influence in Africa. In a New York Times opinion, Kevin Rudd, the 
former Prime Minister of Australia opined,
as Western democracies look increasingly sick, other systems of governance 
are now on offer…. China has become increasingly confident of its own 
model, described as authoritarian or state capitalism. And its ‘Beijing 
Consensus’ is held up to the non-Western world as an example of a more 
effective form of national, and even international, governance. (Rudd 2018)
Rudd portrays the non-Western world as looking up to other powers for 
inspiration and examples, rather than as competitive states that can mold their 
own models of development. The implication is that these non-Western regions, 
majorly Africa, are objects of competition between the West and China. John 
Bolton, Donald Trump’s former National Security Advisor highlights the nature 
of that global competition over Africa: “Great powers, namely China and Russia, 
are rapidly expanding their financial and political influence in Africa. They are 
deliberately and aggressively targeting their investments in the region [Africa] to gain 
a competitive advantage over the United States” (Bolton 2018). Africa is, therefore, 
depicted as a continent up for grabs and this has become even more prominent with 
the rise of China and its increased engagement with Africa (Dok and Thayer 2019).
The portrayal of African states as “system ineffectual” is not without 
basis. Africa’s material capabilities support the “lack-of-agency” argument. 
for example, the aggregate GDP of Sub-Saharan Africa in 2018 was US$1.7 
trillion—at par with the GDP of Canada, slightly higher than South Korea’s 
(US$1.6 trillion) and less than Brazil’s (US$1.8 trillion). With such a paltry GDP 
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and under the weight of incessant intrastate-armed conflicts, political instability, 
poverty, and food insecurity, Sub-Saharan Africa is dependent on foreign aid 
and humanitarian assistance from external donors. Even its continental body, 
the African Union, is headquartered in a building constructed and donated by 
China and aid is its largest source of funding, the EU being the biggest donor 
(Pharatlhatlhe and Vanheukelom 2019, 5). Unsurprisingly, for both the EU and 
China, Africa is the biggest beneficiary of their development and humanitarian 
assistance, a fact that highlights the region’s incapacity to underwrite its own 
development, security, and sustenance. Such is the extent of Africa’s fragility 
and impotence that Jean-francois Bayart (2009, 5) concluded that Africa is 
“permanently under the yoke of external actors.” These “external actors” 
that Jean-francois Bayart refers to, have varied across Africa’s recent history, 
ranging from traditional colonial powers like Britain, france, and Portugal to 
the United States and now emerging economies such as China and India.
The lack in material capabilities means that the ideational capabilities of 
African states are of no major effect in international politics and are peripheral in 
global forums. The lack of ideational capabilities is exposed in global discourses 
on poverty and development in which Africa is the subject of discussion rather 
than an equal partner. In 2001, British Prime Minister Tony Blair described the 
state of Africa as “a scar on the conscience of the world” (Blair 2001). In addition, 
from the Structural Adjustment Programs of the late 1980s, to the crisis of 
governance narrative by the World Bank (1989), and more recently, China’s model 
of development, Africa, together with Latin America, has been a testing ground 
for development paradigms created elsewhere. A survey of 36 African countries 
conducted by Afrobarometer in 2015 reveals the dominance of external models 
of development and the absence of “home-grown” models in Africa (Lekorwe 
et al. 2016). It showed that in the surveyed countries, China ranks second as a 
development model after the United States and as the greatest external influence in 
African countries after the countries’ former colonial powers. The fact that Africa’s 
varied models of governance, economy, and development mirror those of their 
former colonizers, or are enmeshed with aspects from other non-Western regions, 
reflects the ideational crisis in Africa. A further illustration of this challenge is 
that, despite attempts by South Africa’s former President Thabo Mbeki to promote 
African ethos and norms such as Ubuntu under the African Renaissance movement, 
their application in international relations has remained marginal and subservient 
to Western norms of humanitarianism, development, and politics (Hodzi 2017a).
Based on these material and ideational challenges, it seems justified to 
portray Africa as ineffectual, lacking agency, and a passive recipient of charity 
from the West, and more recently from China. Despite increasing research on the 
agency of African states in their relations with global powers, especially China 
(Carmody and Taylor 2010; Chiyemura 2019; Hodzi 2017b; Lopes 2016; Mohan 
and Lampert 2013), the portrayal of African states as ineffectual and impotent is 
persistent. Based on this backdrop, and going beyond the agency of African states 
and their ruling elites, this article explores how states in Africa are strategically 
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shaping the norms of development paradigms promoted by foreign powers and 
socializing external actors. Empirically focusing on China’s development model 
in Africa, the article examines how political elites in countries like Ethiopia and 
Zimbabwe are shaping and diffusing norms related to the model; and how, through 
their ingenuity, China is being socialized into their preferred regional order. 
The main argument is that political elites in the two countries are strategically 
reconstructing the China model, creating their own multifaceted versions that 
delicately balance their own domestic interests and their bilateral relations with 
China, while deriving maximum benefits from the People’s Republic of China.
Opportunities Presented by China to African Elites
The lack of African states’ material and ideational capabilities mask the 
agency of its political elites. In this article, political elites refer to “distinct high-
level political officials (the president, his/her advisers and cabinet ministers) 
collectively referred to as the Executive” who, by virtue of positions they occupy 
in government, “have the authority to make, enforce and ensure implementation 
of their domestic and foreign policies” (Hodzi 2017a, 193). In terms of structural 
power, defined by Susan Strange (1988, 25) as the power “to decide how things 
shall be done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each 
other, relate to people, or relate to corporate enterprises,” it is critical to shift focus 
from African states to political elites in Africa. This is because, notwithstanding 
their weak states, some political elites in Africa, even at the height of the Cold 
War, became experts “in appearing to emulate the ideologies of their patrons to 
coax out further material support” (Corkin 2013, 3). Although their capacity to 
play global powers against each other whittled under the United States’ unipolar 
moment, the attempt by China to play a key role in international development has 
created opportunities for them to strategically shape and reframe development 
paradigms promoted by global powers and implemented in Africa to suit their 
domestic and international objectives. However, how does the emergence of China 
as an actor in international development provide them with such an opportunity?
The People’s Republic of China refers to its development trajectory as an 
experience that other countries, especially in the Global South, can learn from. 
In Xi Jinping’s words, “it offers a new option for other countries and nations who 
want to speed up their development while preserving their independence” (Xinhua 
2017). Indeed, China’s extraordinary economic growth and highly effective poverty 
reduction mechanisms have provided an example worth emulating, especially 
for developing countries that for long had become disenchanted by the liberal 
development paradigm. Opportunities presented to African Elites by China as 
a key actor in international development. As a result, political leaders, scholars, 
and the media started alluding to the existence of a China model of development. 
What the China model of development actually is contested. Stephen Halper 
(2010, 48) refers to it as the Beijing Consensus and describes it as a “market 
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authoritarian model”—suggesting that it rivals the neoliberal development 
paradigm capsulated in the Washington Consensus. Zhang (2012, 65), the leading 
proponent of the China model, describes it as a socialist market economy unique 
to China. Although several other scholars (see e.g., Chen and Naughton 2017; 
deLisle 2017; Kennedy 2010; Ramo 2004; Zhang 2012; Zhao 2017) have also 
sought to decipher the China model, there remain diverse interpretations and 
findings, making it difficult to determine what the China model is. Making it 
even more puzzling is that there is no consensus among government officials in 
China on the existence of a China model and its conceptualization. As a result, 
the Chinese government sends mixed signals—denying the existence of the 
China model while simultaneously urging BRICS countries to synergize their 
development strategies to enhance international development. yet, even in the 
absence of an official conceptualization of the China model, political elites in 
Zimbabwe, the Gambia, and Ethiopia, among others, allude to a China model 
inspiring their own development policies and strategies.
References to the China model of development provide several opportunities 
to African political elites, and those opportunities are encapsulated in three 
contradictions in China’s foreign policy strategy. The first contradiction is China’s 
conflicting dual identity as both a developing country and a major country. 
In April 2019, Beijing insisted on retaining its categorization as a developing 
country at the WTO to continue benefiting from “special and differentiated 
treatment” (Lee 2019). In addition, the developing country status enables 
China to gain competitive advantage in developing countries, giving credence 
to its South-South cooperation, the view of mutually beneficial, peaceful 
development, and the win-win principles that underscore its Africa strategy. 
In that respect, the developing country identity gives its development model 
legitimacy in Africa because it promotes the model as peer-to-peer learning 
compared to the asymmetries of the liberal development paradigm and North-
South cooperation. The categorization as a developing country also provides 
China with maneuverability in global governance and provision of public goods. 
It enables Beijing to select international responsibilities based on its current 
interests. At the same time, China has, since the presidency of Xi Jinping, 
identified itself  as a major country seeking an equal say with the United States 
in global governance, and pushing for “major country diplomacy” which can be 
interpreted as a demand to co-govern with the United States. The implication 
of this contradictory dual identity is that the “developing country” identity is 
getting less buy-in among African political elites—who are increasingly seeing 
China as a major power seeking to avoid international responsibilities, and 
therefore, not a sincere South-South partner.
The second contradiction is that Beijing acknowledges its ambition to expand 
its global influence but denies seeking hegemony. In his speech to delegates at 
the 19th Communist Party of China (CPC) National Congress, Xi Jinping (Xi 
2017, 53) declared that, “No matter what stage of development it reaches, China 
will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion.” Earlier on in the speech, he 
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had stated that by 2035, “China’s cultural soft power [should have] grown much 
stronger” (23); and that from 2035 to the middle of the twenty-first century, 
China should “have become a global leader in terms of composite national 
strength and international influence” (25). Beijing’s insistence on not seeking 
to be a hegemon is meant to dispel the China threat theory, and reassure the 
Global South that it will not use its economic preponderance to intervene in 
the internal affairs of other states and enforce its norms on them. yet China’s 
behavior in the South China Sea dispute, and the way it imposes trade sanctions 
on countries that take contra-Beijing positions on issues such as Taiwan, Tibet, 
and Uyghur Muslims show its tendency to use material capabilities to achieve its 
objectives. Similarly, as put by George yu (1966, 468),
while accepting Africa’s goal of economic independence, China once more 
has sought to shape that goal in accordance with her own policy objectives. 
[And] The emphasis on self-reliance, for example, interacts with the limited 
capacity of Peking actually to provide large-scale aid and its intense 
reluctance to see such aid provided by others.
Thus, Beijing’s antihegemony statements obscure its hegemonic behavior and 
ambitions.
As put by Robert Cox (1994, 366), “hegemony is a form in which dominance 
is obscured by achieving an appearance of acquiescence… As if  it were 
the natural order of things [it] is an internalized coherence which has most 
probably arisen from externally imposed rules but has been transformed into an 
intersubjectively constituted reality.” Indeed, China has framed its dominance 
over other countries and justified punishing countries that do not abide by the 
One China Policy, understood as mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty 
and noninterference, thus, giving it an appearance of acquiescence. for instance, 
on three occasions, China pressured the South African government to deny the 
Dalai Lama a visa to visit the country. Moreover, because it does not use its 
military power to enforce compliance with its policies, China reasons that it does 
not seek hegemony but just greater influence. However, Richard Saull (2010) 
argues that force is an exception in hegemonic arrangements—and therefore, the 
nonuse of force or violence by China does not mean that it is not hegemonic in 
its ambitions and behavior—it simply suggests that China is better at obscuring 
them.
Does China have a development model or not? This question reflects the 
third contradiction. On the one hand, China claims that,
the path, the theory, the system, and the culture of socialism with 
Chinese characteristics have kept developing, blazing a new trail for other 
developing countries to achieve modernization. It offers a new option for 
other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while 
preserving their independence; and it offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese 
approach to solving the problems facing mankind. (Xi 2017, 9)
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Statements like these reflect China’s growing confidence in its role as a major 
power able to exercise global influence—and provides an alternative to African 
states looking for new models to achieve development. On the other hand, 
it claims that the model cannot be replicated by other countries because it is 
exceptional to China. By saying, it does not have a model that can be copied; 
China is indirectly influencing African countries to trust China as a nonimposing 
power, thus, making its model of development more appealing. Either way, 
Beijing is indirectly socializing African elites to reject “imposed” Western 
development models that are in competition with China’s model of development. 
Accordingly, “Africa, in short, is subordinate in Chinese thought and policy to 
a Weltanschauung—which in turn derives from the manner in which the Chinese 
Communist leaders relate their historic experiences to the modern world and 
their current sense of Chinese national interest” (yu 1966, 468).
In claiming that its development trajectory provides an option for other 
countries, Beijing implies that it has a model of development that other countries 
can adopt and adapt to fit their contexts. Whether the countries adopt it voluntarily 
or under duress is not the issue—the issue is that there is a model of development 
and modernization that Beijing believes is applicable to countries in the Global 
South. The establishment of training institutions such as the Institute of South-
South Cooperation and Development (ISSCAD), set up by the Chinese government 
at Peking University in 2016 to train “government officials and social elites from 
developing countries for a professional degree of national development” reflects 
China’s confidence in its development model (MOfCOM 2016). According 
to China’s Ministry of Commerce, “the aim is to share the experience of state 
management, to deal with polities, to help other developing countries cultivate 
high-end government management personnel and to jointly discuss a development 
road of multi-elements” (MOfCOM 2016). In using these training institutions to 
promote its development model, the expectation is that “as other countries learn 
and adopt aspects of the China model, they will become more likely to align with 
China, to share China’s values, and to connect with China’s leaders” (Kurlantzick 
2013). furthermore, this implies that China has a model of development aimed at 
teaching other countries to achieve national development in the same manner that 
it achieved its own development—and the adoption of China’s development model 
by Africa will enhance its international status and global influence.
Implications of the Three Contradictions
The effect of these three main contradictions is that there is no consensus, 
even within the Communist Party of China, on what the China model is. 
Without a clear and concise conceptualization of the China model, there can 
be no regime to underpin it—making it less developed compared to its rival, 
the liberal development paradigm. As put by yuen yuen Ang (2018), “despite 
urging other countries to learn from ‘Chinese wisdom’ and ‘the China solution’,” 
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Xi never specifies what this means.” The implication is that, depending on the 
audience, certain characteristics of the China model are highlighted, and they 
mostly consist of the following: (1) practice-based reasoning; (2) a strong state; 
(3) prioritizing stability; (4) primacy of the people’s livelihood; (5) gradual 
reform; (6) correct priorities and sequences; (7) a mixed socialist economy; and 
(8) opening up to the outside world (Zhang 2012, 89). More recently, Xi Jinping 
has begun to enunciate the “Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” 
which underpin China’s domestic and foreign policy (Xi 2017). The main 
components of the Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics as 
explained by President Xi on October 18, 2017 are: (1) ensuring Party leadership 
over all work; (2) committing to people-centered approach; (3) continuing to 
comprehensively deepen reform; (4) adopting a new vision for development; (5) 
seeing that people run the country; (6) ensuring every dimension of governance 
is law based; (7) upholding core socialist values; (8) ensuring and improving 
living standards through development; (9) ensuring harmony between human 
and nature; (10) pursuing holistic approach to national security; (11) upholding 
absolute Party leadership over the people’s armed forces; (12) upholding the 
principle of “one country, two systems” and promoting national reunification; 
(13) promoting the building of a community with a shared future for mankind; 
and (14) exercising full and rigorous governance over the Party. Principal 
components of the “Thought” are the primacy of the CPC over all matters, 
and the preeminence of development, which acts as the legitimizer of the CPC 
rulership. This cocktail of unexpatiated characteristics, maxims, and thoughts 
make it difficult for Beijing to provide a comprehensive model of development 
that is clear for the Global South to follow.
Regardless of the murkiness of the China model, Beijing seems convinced 
that its development trajectory is relevant to other developing countries and is 
essential for the “further rise in China’s international influence, ability to inspire, 
and power to shape” (Xi 2017, 6). To underpin that rise in international influence 
and spur the traction of its development experience in the Global South, China’s 
strategy includes setting up alternative financial institutions such as the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Through these alternative institutions, 
Beijing “aims to lock in a Sinocentric vision of the world through parallel 
institutions, disruptive initiatives, and rewriting of global rules” (feigenbaum 
2018). In addition, major projects such as “the Belt and Road Initiative, give 
equal emphasis to ‘bringing in’ and ‘going out,’ follow the principle of achieving 
shared growth through discussion and cooperation, and increase openness and 
cooperation in building innovation capacity” (Xi 2017, 30). Importantly, discussion 
and cooperation are the means through which China seeks to establish its global 
influence and legitimize its development model. The discussion and cooperation 
strategy resembles Keohane’s (1984, 78-9) neoliberal paradigm argument that 
a hegemony can be formed “through intensive interaction among a few players 
[which] helps to substitute for, or supplement, the actions of a hegemon.” However, 
discussion and cooperation entail the existence of a community of states.
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China is gradually, but subtly, setting up that community of states, with 
itself  at the center—more like a Sino-centric community of states. According 
to President Xi, China is creating “a garden shared by all countries” enabling 
them to share in its development and prosperity (Xi 2016). Although Beijing 
argues that it is not seeking to become a hegemon, its “garden-for-all-countries” 
ambition is an attempt to create “shared interests by providing rewards for 
cooperation and punishment for defection” (Keohane 1984, 79). Indeed, with 
the establishment of AIIB and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has 
effectively established an alternative community of states. As the main architect 
of this “garden” or community of states, China sets the rules of membership 
and engagement in its institutions thus creating a web of influence through rule 
making and institutional building. In other words, through AIIB and BRI, China 
determines who becomes part of these institutions and who does not, thereby 
providing rewards for members of the institutions and effectively punishing-
by-exclusion those states that do not conform. for instance, because Swaziland 
maintains diplomatic ties with Taiwan, which is against the One China Policy, 
it is excluded from BRI projects and forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(fOCAC) summits. The implication is that China has a community of states 
(still in the formative stages) and platforms such as fOCAC for it to put into 
effect its discussion and cooperation strategy.
These platforms, in particular the fOCAC summits, have increasingly 
become institutionalized, enabling China to socialize African states into its 
preferred norms which is critical for its discussion and cooperation strategy to be 
effective. Socialization
‘is a process of learning in which norms and ideals are transmitted from 
one party to another’ the expectation is that ‘national leaders internalize 
the norms and value orientations espoused by the hegemony and, as 
a consequence, become socialized into the community formed by the 
hegemony and other nations accepting its leadership position.’ (Ikenberry 
and Kupchan 1990, 289-90)
The challenge for China, concerning its model of development, is that there 
are no clear-cut norms apart from the generalized, South-South Cooperation, 
respect for state sovereignty, noninterference, and mutual benefit. In addition, 
without consensus, even in Beijing on which the China model is based, the 
process of “inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” is 
ineffective because there can be no compliance without consensus on the norms 
and rules to be complied with (Checkel 2005, 804). The effect is that, in Africa, 
political elites are following the logic of consequences rather than the logic of 
appropriateness. As highlighted earlier on, African elites simply acquiesce to 
China’s declarations at fOCAC summits to access material benefits; hence, they 
are driven by fear of consequences of being excluded from China’s community, 
or “garden,” as Xi Jinping puts it—there is no internalization of any norms.
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In addition to fOCAC summits, China has used bilateral engagement and 
direct contact with African political elites as part of its discussion and cooperation 
strategy. Through tailor-made training programs for government officials from 
Africa, cultural exchanges, high-level government exchanges, and party-to-party 
exchanges, the Chinese government has direct interaction with African political 
elites. Beijing’s objective is that these African elites will internalize China’s 
norms and realign their countries’ domestic and foreign policies with Beijing’s 
core interests. Through reliance on “ideological persuasion and transnational 
learning,” Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990, 290) argue that a dominant power 
can “produce cooperative outcomes without resorting to material sanctions and 
inducements.” The effectiveness of this strategy is yet to be seen, but so far, there 
has been no significant shift in most African countries’ policies, partly because 
there is no consensus on what the Chinese model of development norms are.
Instead, although professing support for China’s domestic and foreign policy, 
most African political elites “embrace and espouse the [policies] articulated by 
the hegemony for instrumental reasons, either to minimize domestic costs of 
compliant behavior or to take advantage of elite restructuring to build new 
coalitions” (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 291). The main reason is that the 
strategy of most African elites is to pretend to follow the ideological preferences 
of China to derive material benefits, while doing the same to the United States 
and the EU. They have to juggle the “perceived norms” of the China model 
of development and governance with maintaining legitimacy as a democratic 
state to continue benefitting from the West. Accordingly, what China regards 
as a community is a loose collective of pragmatic and self-interested states that 
are in it for the rewards that China provides—and there is no internalization of 
community rules.
The Agency of African Political Elites
China’s public support for multilateralism mask its “private” preference for 
bilateralism. In the case of Africa, while the fOCAC summits reflect a multilateral 
approach, the projects and initiatives announced at the summits are negotiated 
bilaterally. The effect of bilateralism between a global power like China and a small 
state in Africa is that there are “two key problems: information asymmetry and 
preferences asymmetry” (Regilme 2018, 346). In other words, although political 
elites in Africa are invited to fOCAC summits, specialized trainings, high-level 
exchanges, etc., their bureaucracies in Africa still lack complete information 
about the China model of development and the regimes that underpin it. The 
absence of consensus on what the China model is among elites in Beijing does 
not make it better. Neither does Beijing’s insistence on China’s exceptionalism—
the argument that China’s economic development is a result of its uniqueness. 
Accordingly, there is no known official policy document in Beijing that explains 
its development model, and the fact that until recently there was no centralized 
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development assistance management framework means that African elites are 
susceptible to competition among Chinese ministries and departments. The effect 
is that African political elites know substantially little about the China model to 
implement it in their own countries. As a result, they tend to select elements of the 
model that advance their domestic and international interests. for instance, an 
Ethiopian diplomat in Beijing explained that Ethiopia is learning about China’s 
strong state to implement the same in Ethiopia. At the end, Ethiopia will end up 
with its own version of a development model, which it then labels “the Chinese 
model of development” to superficially align it with China.
The second effect is that there is a preference asymmetry between China and 
African political elites. China’s objective, as explained by Zhang (2012, x), is 
to promote “a new model of development and a new political discourse which 
questions many of the Western assumptions about democracy, good governance 
and human rights.” While several African elites have questioned those Western 
assumptions of democracy and governance, they have done so not necessarily 
because of socialization from China, but out of frustration with the West. for 
instance, former President of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe started questioning the 
sincerity of the West and its democracy promotion when the EU and the United 
States imposed sanctions on the country because of his regime’s human rights 
abuses. It is only then that he launched the “Look East Policy” and cultivated 
stronger diplomatic relations with China. The driving force for Mugabe was 
the need for an alternative development partner and source for diplomatic 
support, foreign direct investment, and development financing. Meles Zenawi, 
the former prime minister of Ethiopia, also disgruntled by the West’s emphasis 
on democracy and human rights, cultivated Ethiopia’s relations with China 
and sought to apply what he termed a “developmental state model” in Ethiopia 
to strengthen his regime. African elites’ engagement and adoption of China’s 
“preferred norms” is not based on the attractiveness of its model of development. 
It has been used to justify a strong state that guarantees their regimes’ survival. 
Therefore, depending on the domestic and transnational interests of particular 
elites, they emphasize elements of the model that can potentially advance their 
interests.
African countries, due to their colonial heritage, derive their legitimacy 
from acceptance by the international community (Jackson 1987). for that, 
they have to maintain a façade of  democracy, a respect for human rights, 
and align with the liberal international order norms. Generally, states in 
Africa mirror the European state in terms of  institutions and norms, which 
is usually repulsive to the norms and principles that underpin the China 
model—a strong state and socialist market economy. furthermore, because 
their legitimacy depends on acceptance by the West, their internalization of 
China’s development, political, and governance systems is only to the extent 
that it does not upset domestic and international actors. To get around this 
challenge, as noted by Regilme (2018, 349), these elites “redefine external 
norms as a political strategy, in which the quintessential goal is to enhance 
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political authority and promote regime survival.” for instance, in Rwanda, 
President Kagame has justified his authoritarian leadership as necessary to 
achieve economic development—just as the CPC does in China. In addition to 
appeasing both China and the West, the African political elites also consider 
local recipients, particularly opposition leaders who may have enough 
influence to challenge their regimes’ survival. for example, President Julius 
Maada Bio of  Sierra Leone canceled a US$300 million airport deal signed by 
his predecessor and China. The official reason was that it was “uneconomical 
to proceed with the construction of  a new airport when the existing one is 
grossly under-utilized” (Marsh and Westcott 2018). However, this reason 
masked the domestic political dynamics. The president was under pressure to 
reverse deals signed by his predecessor that lacked transparency. In exercising 
their agency in this manner, political elites in Africa are able to force China to 
reconsider how it conducts its business and engages with Africa.
Beijing promotes its model of development as an alternative for countries 
that want to achieve national development without losing their sovereignty. 
The subtle objective is to inspire African elites to challenge interventions by 
the West while aligning themselves with China as a source of inspiration for 
“independent” development. In that respect, China increases its influence by 
offering an alternative to the United States, which in turn emboldens authoritarian 
regimes that undermine liberal values. China is using this strategy “to secure its 
position at home and abroad… as a result of pragmatic decisions about Chinese 
interests rather than a wholesale rejection of the U.S.-led international order” 
(Weiss 2019). Similarly, political elites like those headed by yoweri Museveni 
(Uganda), Edgar Lungu (Zambia), and Emmerson Mnangagwa (Zimbabwe) 
are also using their engagement with China to challenge the liberal values, while 
strengthening state surveillance of their citizens and shrinking democratic space. 
In 2017, Mnangagwa announced that he was going to implement socialism with 
Zimbabwean characteristics and consider the Chinese development model as 
an alternative for Zimbabwe (The Standard 2018). The sincerity of these claims 
is doubtful because, beyond the pronouncements, there has been very little 
evidence of the China model except elements that strengthen his position in 
power. What makes it possible for these African elites to select those elements of 
the China model that advance their domestic and international interests is that 
no regimes underpin the China model. This provides opportunities for political 
elites in Africa to instrumentalize “policy discourses in an attempt to justify the 
perceived relative gains of bilateral interstate cooperation” (Regilme 2018, 344).
China and African Elites: Who is Playing Whom?
The instrumentalization and transactionalization of  China-Africa relations 
brings us to what may seem an unrelated topic: who is playing whom? Why do 
African elites break deals signed with China by their predecessors? Why is China 
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increasingly becoming selective on the deals that it signs with African countries? 
Does this have any implications for the evolution of the China model?
The cancelation and renegotiation of infrastructure construction deals by 
African elites is indicative of their agency and attempt to reshape their countries’ 
relations with China. yet there are complexities emanating from the underlying 
conflation of personal, national, and global interests. for example, the personal 
power preservation interests of President Julius Maada Bio motivated the 
cancelation of an airport construction deal backed by Chinese loans in Sierra 
Leone. Canceling a deal signed by a predecessor in the name of the national 
interest—at a time when competition between the United States and China for 
influence in Africa is on the increase—was possibly the surest way for President 
Bio to enhance his legitimacy and gain the support of the United States. In the 
same manner, President John Magufuli of Tanzania suspended the US$10 billion 
Bagamoyo Port project agreed by his predecessor Jakaya Kikwete arguing that 
“conditions set by the investor were tantamount to selling Tanzania to China” 
(Onyango 2019). He then imposed five conditions, which the investor, the China 
Merchants Holdings International (CMHI), a Beijing-based company, had to 
agree to for the project to resume. The conditions included reduction of CMHI’s 
lease agreement from 99 years to 33 years, removal of the tax holiday, and special 
status on water and electricity rates. He also quashed the no-competition clause, 
allowing the government of Tanzania to develop other ports to compete with 
the Bagamoyo Port, and prohibited CMHI from starting any business within the 
port without the approval of the Tanzanian government. Through this, Magufuli 
was able to reassert his authority and legitimacy in Tanzania, which was waning 
due to increased authoritarian tendencies. More importantly, it enabled him to 
dilute what he regards as Chinese dominance in Tanzania by bringing in other 
investors from Oman into the port project. Thus, the reasserting of agency by 
some African elites is a cocktail resulting from generous dashes of personal, 
national, and geopolitical interests.
Meanwhile, China is recalibrating its interests in Africa as a response to an 
increased questioning of its operations by some African elites. Most importantly, 
the recalibration is to address losses resulting from poor investments in Africa 
and wastage of resources. In 2015, China refused, despite signing several 
memorandum agreements, to fund former Zimbabwe President Mugabe’s 
US$4 billion infrastructure and economic revival program. Media reports 
citing government officials suggested that China was concerned about political 
instability, corruption, inefficiencies in government, and lack of viability of the 
proposed projects (Mail and Guardian 2015). As a result, there were reports 
that Beijing wanted to second Chinese officials in Zimbabwe’s ministries and 
parastatals to secure its investments from widespread government corruption. 
Such consideration of local politics to make decisions regarding the funding 
of projects reflects a shift in China’s policy of noninterference in the internal 
affairs of its partners. Beyond that, China has also rejected funding proposals 
from Kenya and Uganda on the basis that the projects were not financially 
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viable—even though they were of paramount political importance to President 
Kenyatta (Kenya) and President Museveni (Uganda) who are facing elections 
in the next year. These few examples show that insofar as African elites are 
reasserting their agency in their countries’ relations with China, China is also 
restructuring its operations in Africa, and paying more attention to its overall 
geopolitical, national, and economic interests.
Part of the restructuring of Beijing’s engagement with Africa is motivated 
by domestic concerns in China that investments and loans granted to African 
countries have not achieved the intended results. flagship projects such as the 
Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway funded up to US$4 billion and the Mombasa-
Nairobi railway project, which cost upward of US$3 billion, mostly in Chinese-
backed loans, have been operating below capacity. As a result, Ethiopian 
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed renegotiated the repayment period of the loans 
from 10 years to 30 years. Kenya’s appeal for a loan to extend the Mombasa-
Nairobi railway was rejected by China. In addition, calls by several African 
countries for China to cancel their debts have not been successful. All these 
developments are part of Beijing’s efforts to consolidate its BRI and restructure 
its investments across the globe to focus on the most productive, in economic 
and geopolitical terms. The setting up of training institutions such as ISSCAD 
to teach political elites from the Global South, especially in Africa, plus backing 
public administration and governance strategies necessary to implement the 
China model, together with major infrastructure projects such as the BRI, are 
steps toward rebalancing relations with Africa and ensure success of its major 
projects there. To plug inefficiencies in its aid allocation and management, the 
establishment of the China International Development Cooperation Agency 
will reduce free-riding and the careless disbursement of development assistance, 
of which Africa is the biggest recipient. The implication is that the emergence of 
African elites’ agency is at odds with the weakened state of African economies 
and their dependence on China for investments and infrastructure loans. 
Nonetheless, this is not new for Africa. In the Cold War era, despite their 
weakness, African elites still managed to play big powers, including China and 
Russia, against each other. But, as the global coronavirus pandemic takes its 
toll on most global powers amid a resurgence of ultranationalism in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, African elites may not have as many options as 
they had before—which strengthens China’s position in Africa.
Conclusion
The implementation of the China model in Africa is hamstrung. first, there 
is no consensus within and outside China on what constitutes the China model—
let alone the norms that premise it. Second, the model is not implemented in a 
vacuum, the making of the African state is based on liberal values of democracy 
and human rights that are antithetical to the China model. for China to 
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socialize African countries, African states’ social, cultural, political, and 
economic systems need to be reconstituted. However, with Chinese ideologies 
such as socialism with Chinese characteristics emphasizing the exceptionalism 
of China, it is difficult to derive norms from China’s model of development. The 
result is that some political elites in Africa are selecting elements of the China 
model that they prefer and that serve their domestic and international interests. 
Beijing is, therefore, losing control of the norm development, diffusion, and 
socialization of African states. Instead, it is being forced to reconsider and be 
pragmatic in the norms it advances to African countries—something akin to the 
proverbial “crossing the river by feeling the stones.”
Even in cases where China has reframed its engagement with Africa, 
with a community of states held by the logic of consequences rather than the 
logic of appropriateness, alignment with the China model by African elites is 
superficial. At best, it is transactional, and using their agency, African political 
elites are leveraging on China to renegotiate their reengagement with the West, 
ensure their regimes’ survival and contain internal dissent in their countries. 
As put by yan (2015), China’s strategy is to “allow smaller countries to benefit 
economically from their relationship with China. for China, we need good 
relationships more urgently than we need economic development. We let them 
benefit economically, and in turn, we get good political relationships. We should 
‘purchase’ the relationships.” The purchase of relationships and influence by 
China has further strengthened African elites’ leverage and agency—enabling 
them to derive massive benefits for very little policy alignment with Beijing. 
In fact, Beijing’s model of development is used to justify their regime survival 
strategies.
In addition, the implementation of the China model through alternative 
institutions such as the BRI and AIIB is effective with African political elites’ 
collaboration. That gives African political elites leverage to negotiate and 
reshape the China model so that what ends up being labeled the China model 
depends on the domestic and international interests of the African government. 
Hence, there are multivariate versions of the China model. This means that 
China has no monopoly over the norms, values, and principles that underpin its 
development paradigm. furthermore, with limited regimes to back its discussion 
and cooperation strategy, and the fact that China is not expanding its influence 
in a vacuum, but in a political, cultural, and economic space already occupied 
by former colonial powers that still maintain influence in their former African 
colonies, Beijing lacks the capacity to enforce and promote the China model in 
Africa. In addition, it is this discussion and cooperation that African elites have 
seized and used to their advantage—negotiating and influencing the China’s 
strategy in Africa and its implementation, in most cases favoring African 
countries that retain the power to decide the kind of investments, developments, 
and relations they want with China.
finally, China does not have an alternative order in place. Neither has it 
laid out what the China model is and how it can be implemented. While there 
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is a liberal international order (which is honored more in the breach than in 
the observance), there is no alternative Chinese order. The implication is that 
the China model, with its principles and underpinning norms, is implemented 
within a liberal international order context. This has created opportunities for 
political elites to influence the norms that underpin the China model, recreating 
it in some cases and molding it to suit their own domestic and global preferences 
in others. Accordingly, strategic reframing and interpretation of the China 
model by political elites in Africa is contributing to shaping the model and how 
it is perceived globally, for good or bad.
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